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is correct is another question ; but at any rate it is a subject of reason. Says Buddha ("Mahātanhāsakhamya Sutta, Majjhima Nikāya," Vol. I. p. 265) : "If ye now know thus, and see thus, O disciples, will ye then say : We respect the Master, and out of reverence for the Master do we thus speak?"—"That we shall not, O sire." — . . . "What ye speak, O disciples, is it not even that which ye have yourselves known, yourselves seen, yourselves realised?"—"It is, sire." Here is a religion without a supra-rational sanction for conduct. And the fact goes to disprove Mr. Kidd's whole theory.*

T. J. McC.

PAIN, PLEASURE, AND ÆSTHETICS. An Essay Concerning the Psychology of Pain and Pleasure, with Special Reference to Æsthetics. By *Henry Rutgers Marshall*, M.A. London and New York : Macmillan & Co. 1894. Pp. 359. Price \$3.00.

The main idea of this book is to treat æsthetics as a branch of hedonics ; art is viewed as a species of pleasure, and artistic enjoyment is defined as that kind of pleasure which is relatively permanent in revival (Chap. III). This classification, simple though it is as stated in its generality, is defended by the author with elaborate circumlocution by investigations into the psychology of the phenomena of pleasure and pain, for which he coins the new word *algedonic*† (derived from *ἄλγος* and *ἡδονή*). The first chapter (pp. 1-62) contains a discussion of feeling, emotion, *Gefühl*, *Empfindung*, *sensibilité* in their relation to algedonic phenomena ; the theory that "pleasure and pain are qualities of a most general nature, either one of which may, and one of which must, belong to each psychic element which is differentiable" (p. 61) being proposed as a working hypothesis. The fourth and fifth chapters discuss the much mooted problem of the physical basis of pleasure and pain. We read on page 169 (repeated on p. 194), "The activity of the organ of any content if efficient is pleasurable, if inefficient is painful." Efficiency or inefficiency are described as "functions of the relation between activity and nutrition, pleasure being dependent upon the use of surplus stored force and pain upon conditions under which the outcome of the organ's activity is less than should be expected in consideration of the energy involved in the stimulus." This view seems to us wholly inadequate to cover the facts to be explained, but the author not only finds some corroboration of it, but also trusts it "to be in line with the important position maintained in Chapter I, namely that pleasure and pain are general qualities" as stated above. In the second chapter the author protests against identifying the emotions with pleasure and pain phenomena (p. 90 and 94-95), calling the former "representative pleasures and pains" and defining them as "the psychic coincidents of relatively fixed co-ordinated

* Mr. Kidd says the notion of *Karman* is the ultra-rational sanction of Buddhism, and with this dismisses this religion as fitting in with his theory. But the kernel of the idea of *Karman* is certainly not ultra-rational, unless the theory of heredity and evolution are so.

† *Alghedonic* (to be pronounced "alg-hē-do'nic," not "al-je-donic") would have been more appropriate.

instinctive activities arising upon the appearance of definite objects." The sixth chapter applies the author's theories to what he calls "algedonic æsthetics." Mr. Marshall is aware that "the evidence presented is not crucial," but he is satisfied that "in pushing the theory to its conclusions serious oppositions have not been developed." Nor is it probable that any opposition ever will develop to Mr. Marshall's theories, but we doubt their helpfulness and practical use in the domains of science and art, to the reconciliation of which the work is laudably dedicated. κ.

EMPFINDUNG UND BEWUSSTSEIN. Monistische Bedenken von B. Carneri. Bonn : Emil Strauss. 1893.

It is Mr. Carneri's purpose in this pamphlet to present to the philosophical world the objections which have arisen in his mind affecting the purity of the modern monistic view of the world. Monism, he claims, is scientifically established; the only problem left is *what kind* of monism must be accepted. Mr. Carneri's "objections" are chiefly levelled against the doctrines which claim that mind is simply a side or aspect of matter, and not a function of it; these doctrines logically imply, he thinks, the existence of a nervous system or organisation in all matter, and also a complete unity of nervous and conscious activity, which is absurd. Mind is not, however, an achievement of matter *per se*, but of matter as a *human organism*.

His position apparently implies (1) materialism and (2) agnosticism. But the first is refuted by the fact that in the idealistic view all matter is a simple notion of the mind; and with respect to the second (we quote from a private letter on this subject from the author to the editor of *The Monist*), Mr. Carneri says he will not accept the appellation of "Agnostic," unless he is forced to do so. He does not regard himself as one. He has a very exalted conception of knowledge, which to him is paramount to all, and he says with Kant that it is absolutely incalculable how far man can still penetrate into the secrets of nature. What Mr. Carneri, with Kant, does not regard as belonging in the sphere of human knowledge, because surpassing experience, is the "thing-in-itself" in all its protean aspects. True, he does not use the term "thing-in-itself," and regards it as unfortunate that Kant brought the term into circulation, because it can be, and is, very easily understood, for example by Schopenhauer, as something which has a peculiar essence of its own. Mr. Carneri admits that if he used the expression in this sense one would have every reason for charging him with dualism. But Kant did not understand the expression in this sense, and even characterised this idea of it as a bugbear of the intellect. Things, Mr. Carneri maintains, are simply complexes of sensations. What he calls the "in-itself-existence" of things is that which the things would be if we conceived them severed from our sensations. But of what this is we can acquire no knowledge since it transcends all possible experience, in so far as our experience and with it our knowledge in the last instance leads us back to our sense-activity as to *our own* sensation. With Kant, Mr. Carneri invests things with materiality as a fundamental attribute, while he also classes himself (his feeling) among things. He